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Abstract. We analyse the thesis of Kummerer and Maassen (1996) that classical
probability is unable to model the the stochastic nature of the Aspect experiment,
in which violation of Bell's inequality was experimentally demonstrated. Accord-
ing to these authors the experiment shows the need to introduce the extension of
classical probability known as Quantum Probability. We show that their argu-
ment depends on hidden assumptions and a highly restrictive view of the scope
of classical probability. A careful probabilistic analysis shows, on the contrary,
that it is classical deterministic physical thinking which cannot cope with the
Aspect experiment and therefore needs revision. The ulterior aim of the paper is
to help mathematical statisticians and probabilists to nd their way into the fas-
cinating world of quantum probability (thus: the same aim as that of Kummerer
and Maassen) by dismantling the bamboo curtain between ordinary and quantum
probability which over the years has been built up as physicists and pure math-
ematicians have repeated to one another Feynman's famous dictum `quantum
probability is a dierent kind of probability'.
Introduction
This paper is meant to be read together with the rst part of Kummerer and Maassen
(1996), hereafter referred to as KM. I take it that the reader is now familiar with KM's
description of a card game, following local tradition referred to here as `the Bell spel'
(spel is the Dutch word for a game), in which two players separated from one another are
allowed to share some source of randomisation in an attempt to coordinate their responses
to independent separated random stimuli. KM show that using traditional sources of
randomisation like throwing dice, tossing coins, or looking at the weather, cannot permit
them to improve their performance above a level set by the Bell (1964) inequality. However
if they instead make their responses according to the random transmission or absorption
in polarization lters of two photons emitted by a Calcium atom, they are able to beat
this bound.
According to KM, and they are not alone in making such claims, this graphic exam-
ple shows that in quantum physics random phenomena occur which cannot be modelled
using classical probability (on which the Bell inequality is supposedly based). They claim
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that quantum probability, an extension of the classical Kolmogorov set-up, does yield a
satisfactory model.
In the paper I will argue that KM have adopted a too narrow view of classical proba-
bility. By insisting on a concrete physical interpretation of certain elements of the classical
probability model, they put constraints on the modelling which cannot be satised in the
Aspect experiment (the physical experiment which inspired the more fanciful Bell spel).
Classical probabilistic reasoning therefore allows one to draw interesting physical conclu-
sions from the Bell spel. The concrete physical interpretation which KM requires actually
corresponds to a classical deterministic physical picture of reality, and we learn that this
deterministic physical picture is untenable.
The main ideas of this paper echo Bell (1964). Our mathematical analysis is close to
the analysis of Fine (1982). A particularly careful disection of the concept of locality and
the impact of the Aspect experiment is given in Maudlin (1994). My aim in presenting this
critique of KM is not to deter readers from entering into the wonderful world of quantum
probability but precisely the opposite aim, to help them by removing what is certainly
experienced as an insurmountable barrier to newcomers and which, in my opinion, is in
origin just a communication problem between physicists and mathematicians. I do not deny
that the mathematical model of quantum probability is the perfect vehicle to describe the
Aspect experiment and similar phenomena, nor that as a mathematical structure it can be
seen as an extension of classical probability theory. My quarrel is purely with the claim that
random phenomena occur here, outside of the ambit of classical probability. That widely
made claim has over the years done a great deal of harm, isolating quantum probability
from the attention of ordinary probabilists and statisticians. I agree with Biane (1995; p.
4) that the usual introductions to the theory of non-commutative random variables throw
ordinary probabilists into perplexity, and some demythication is urgently needed.
The paper starts with a brief summary of my interpretation of classical probability.
Then I analyse the Bell spel, and nally give a number of conclusions on the nature of
quantum probability. A `critique' is by denition negative, but elsewhere (Gill, 1995a,b) I
oer a constructive presentation of quantum probability in which from the start a careful
and consistent interpretation is given to the objects of the theory and in which quantum
and classical probability exist in symbiosis, not in opposition. Also despite the criticism
here I would like to emphasise my indebtedness to the authors of KM whose lectures and
whose paper raised my interest (or frustration) to such a level that I abandoned all other
research projects for more than a year in order to nd out how it could possibly be true
that real world random phenomena can contradict the axioms of Kolmogorov.
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Classical Probability
Classical (as opposed to quantum) probability theory obtained its foundations and links
into modern mathematics in precisely the same period which saw the discovery of quantum
mechanics and its own formulation as an axiomatic mathematical theory (quantum prob-
ability). It seems possible that quantum probability has got hard-wired into it a view of
`classical' probability which is indeed classical as opposed to modern; let us say, nineteenth
century probability. In this view probability is part of physics; probability spaces do not
exist and random variables are objects in physics, not mathematics. From physical models
are derived properties of probability distributions and it is probability distributions (in
those days, probability densities or mass functions) which can be further studied within
mathematics. When the mathematical formulation of probability theory is as vague as
that, it is no wonder that misunderstandings can arise and be perpetuated for generations
since conicts have to be resolved by reference to reality (physical experiments), not to
mathematical models.
By classical probability I will refer in the rest of this paper to the modern-day prob-
ability theory ushered in by the Kolmogorov (1933) axiomatization. I will not repeat the
Kolmogorov axioms here but rather discuss their interpretation. It is the claim of KM
that a classical probability model, by which they presumably think of a single probability
space (
;F ;P), cannot accomodate the Aspect experiment. This claim depends on the
one-to-one correspondence which we make between elements in the description of the Bell
spel, and mathematical objects connected to (
;F ;P). I will show that several classical
probability models apply to the Bell spel. (In fact I will claim that in general a quantum
probability model can always be embedded in a classical probability space, the opposite
to what is usually stated in introductions to quantum probability!). Since I am to give an
interpretation of the elements of a classical probability model I must commit myself; here
I take an unashamedly naive frequentist viewpoint.
The usual space (
;F ;P) is in modern probability (but also for Kolmogorov himself)
a model for an experiment which, at least conceptually, can be repeated many times. The
space 
 is a list of all possible outcomes ! of the experiment. Each time the experiment
is carried out the godess Fortuna selects a point ! in 
. She is directed by the probability
measure P in the sense that in a long, long series of repetitions of the experiment, she
will choose an outcome ! 2 A  
 in a fraction P(A) of the time. Here A 2 F is just
a particular collection of outcomes !; it is called an event. When we say `the event A
happens' we mean: the outcome ! lies in A', i.e., satises the property dening elements
of A.
The Kolmogorov axioms therefore attempt no more than to reect the arithmetical
fact that if in a sequence of repetions of an experiment, two events never happen simul-
taneously, then the relative frequency with which either of the events happen is the sum
of their separate relative frequencies. In other words, by this interpretation of probability
the Kolmogorov axioms do not say much more than one plus one equals two (I realise that
this is a point of discussion in quantum physics; however I claim that any experimentalist
who actually counts occurences of dierent events in actually carried out experiments does
heavily rely on the fact that one plus one is two).
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We go on to interpret conditional probabilities as relative frequences within subse-
quences, leading to the formula P(A j B) = P(A \ B)=P(B) when the denominator is
positive. We dene independence as equality of conditional and unconditional probabili-
ties. A random variable X is simply a numerical function of the possible outcomes ! of the
experiment. Its expectation becomes its mean value in many repetitions of the experiment,
and so on.
One may prefer a subjective interpretation of probability. One may point to apparent
circularities in the above description though I believe they are not present if one carefully
distinguishes two levels: the ordinary language of practical experience of casinos, insurance
companies, experimental physicists; and the language of pure mathematics. It is of course
a beautiful and confusing fact that laws of large numbers play a role both as a motivating
principle in constructing the mathematical model, and as a main result inside the resulting
model. This is possible because we imitate one of the interpretational principles|many
repetitions of the same model|with a mathematical structure|product spaces|inside
the model. Apparently the modelling achieves a nice consistency. Whatever controversies
and paradoxes there may be in the foundations of classical probability, I emphasize that
they equally infect quantum probability since, as I believe most physicists agree, quan-
tum probability theory also describes or predicts probabilities in the sense of: relative
frequencies in many many repetitions.
Now, when applying classical probability theory to the real world one might in princi-
ple have to construct the space 
 in a mathematical sense; describe the -algebra of events
F ; specify the probability measure P. Moreover one should make some one-to-one corre-
spondence between items in the mathematical world (!, A, X, : : : ) and the objects in the
real world one wants to model. In practice one does not and cannot give a complete math-
ematical specication of the underlying probability space. Rather one works several layers
higher, perhaps identifying outcomes of some random variables in the model to actually
available statistical data, assuming structural relations between various random variables
and assuming various distributional properties. Typically not much thought is given to the
specication and interpretation of ! and 
. In fact, it is usually only when mathematical
or empirical inconsistencies turn up that one makes a more careful analysis of the under-
lying stochastic model, in an attempt to identify hidden (and inconsistent) assumptions
or false arguments. However let me reiterate and reemphasis that the outcomes ! are no
more than labels of possible dierent outcomes of the experiment modelled by (
;F ;P).
In practice it may be common and it may be convenient to identify the outcomes with
physical objects; for instance, when accurately measuring the height and weight of a US
army recruit one might take ! as the name of a particular person. But it does not have
to be so: ! is just the label of an outcome of an experiment, not a pre-existing physical
object. I believe that this is one of the sources of confusion in the great quantum debate:
physicists are used to associate every mathematical object with something real; in fact,
they use mathematical language to describe reality so this way of thinking is engrained
in their discipline. Mathematicians however, especially those who make it their business
to apply various kinds of pure mathematics to various kinds of real world problems, are
trained precisely to distinguish between mathematical model and real world.
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The Bell spel classically modelled
In the Bell spel two players are repeatedly (separately, simultaneously and independently)
dealt a random playing card. They then each separately say `yes' or `no'. Their aim is to
say the same word more frequently when they both have a red card than when any of the
other three cases occur, together (red/black, black/red, black/black). They are allowed
to let their statement (yes/no) depend on the colour of their own card, and on common,
perhaps random, information, generated independently of the two cards (e.g., the results
of tossing dice or coins or of looking out of the window at the weather). In advance, they
may agree on whatever kind of strategy to follow they like. The only thing they are not
allowed to do is to communicate information about their own card to one another: they
must simultaneously, and at a distance, decide on saying yes or no based on the colour of
just their own playing card and the auxiliary common random information.
We will make and analyse several classical probability models of the Bell spel. In
the paper KM it is shown that the players' aim cannot be satised when using ordinary
randomness. However if they let their yes/no statement depend on whether or not each of
a pair of photons passes through a polarization lter with setting (orientation) determined
by their respective card's colour, then they are able to win the game.
The quantum experiment which in principle can be repeated many times consists
of drawing two playing cards, the simultaneous emission of two photons from an excited
Calcium atom, and their transmission or absorption in two polarization lters which have
been set in orientations according to the colours (red/black) of the two playing cards. Next
to this we consider classical experiments in which instead of the excited Calcium atom,
the photons and the lters we take perhaps some dice, coins, or whatever; toss them, write
down the results, and let each player use some rule depending on her own card and these
auxiliary results to come to a yes/no answer.
Let us rst write down and analyse the classical version of the game. Let A and B be
two 0  1 valued random variables representing the colours of the two playing cards. They
are modelled by independent Bernoulli (
1
2
) variables. Let Z be the auxiliary randomization
which the players may share in their playing strategies. It is a random element taking
values in an arbitrary space; it is independent of A and B. Let X and Y be two 0   1
valued random variables representing the statements of the two players. The players'
strategies consist of two functions which determine X and Y from Z together with A and
B respectively; say X = g(A;Z), Y = h(B;Z). The players' aim is to specify Z and the
functions g and h in order to achieve that
P(X = Y j A = 0; B = 0) >
P(X = Y j A = 0; B = 1) + P(X = Y j A = 1; B = 0) + P(X = Y j A = 1; B = 1):
In fact, in KM the conditional `j' is replaced by the conjunction `&' throughout, but since
we are given that the four marginal probabilities P(A = a;B = b), a; b = 0; 1, are all equal
(and equal to
1
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) that is exactly the same.
We show this is impossible. Since A, B, Z are random variables dened on the same
probability space we can dene next to X and Y (what the players actually say) some
further random variables representing what the players would have said, had their cards
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had each possible colour. Let X
0
= g(0; Z), X
1
= g(1; Z), Y
0
= h(0; Z), Y
1
= h(1; Z);
in this notation, we have X = X
A
and Y = Y
B
. The random variables (note the special
order I will write them in) X
0
, Y
1
, X
1
, Y
0
are all 0   1 valued and hence if within each
subsequent pair (X
0
; Y
1
), (Y
1
;X
1
), (X
1
; Y
0
) the values are dierent, the value taken by the
quadruple (X
0
; Y
1
;X
1
; Y
0
) has to be either (1; 0; 1; 0) or (0; 1; 0; 1). Thus
X
0
6= Y
1
& Y
1
6= X
1
& X
1
6= Y
0
) X
0
6= Y
0
or equivalently
X
0
= Y
0
) X
0
= Y
1
or Y
1
= X
1
or X
1
= Y
0
:
Hence
P(X
0
= Y
0
)  P(X
0
= Y
1
) + P(Y
1
= X
1
) + P(X
1
= Y
0
):
But using independence of Z from A;B,
P(X
a
= Y
b
) = P(g(a;Z) = h(b; Z))
= P(g(a;Z) = h(b; Z) jA = a;B = b)
= P(g(A;Z) = h(B;Z) jA = a;B = b)
= P(X = Y jA = a;B = b);
or in other words,
P(X = Y j A = 0; B = 0) 
P(X = Y j A = 0; B = 1) + P(X = Y j A = 1; B = 0) + P(X = Y j A = 1; B = 1):
Note that this derivation of Bell's inequality makes it very clear that the inequality is
not a deep result from classical probability theory (classical probabilists have never heard
of it!), but the trivial probabilistic consequence of the logical or combinatorial fact that
for any x
0
; y
1
; x
1
; y
0
2 f0; 1g:
x
0
6= y
1
& y
1
6= x
1
& x
1
6= y
0
) x
0
6= y
0
:
We could apply this basic fact to our probabilistic model because the model entailed
that `what each player would have said if her card had had the other colour' was dened
independently of the colour of the other player's card.
Now I turn to the quantum experiment. I postpone the quantum analogue of the
auxiliary randomisation Z for the moment, though of course its putative existence lies at
the heart of the matter. However, we can already start by saying that the experiment
involves 0   1 valued random variables A, B, X, and Y where now A and B represent
simultaneously the colours of the two players' cards and the orientations of two polarization
lters. X and Y represent simultaneously the statements of the two players and whether
or not each of the two photons passes through its respective lter. We agree that A and B
are independent Bernoulli (
1
2
) variables. We also agree on the joint distribution of X and
Y given A and B, as follows (this is where quantum physics comes in). If the two lters
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had xed orientations  and  respectively, and letting X
;
and Y
;
be 0   1 variables
describing the photons' behaviours in that case (0 for transmission, 1 for absorption), then
quantum physics predicts (and experiment conrms) that
P(X
;
= 0; Y
;
= 0) = P(X
;
= 1; Y
;
= 1) =
1
2
sin
2
(  );
P(X
;
= 0; Y
;
= 1) = P(X
;
= 1; Y
;
= 0) =
1
2
cos
2
(  ):
Specifying now angles 
0
= 0; 
1
= =3, 
0
= =2; 
1
= =6 the classical probabilistic
description of KM's Bell spel is nished by dening X = X

A
;
B
, Y = Y

A
;
B
. Sum-
marizing, A and B are independent Bernoulli(
1
2
); conditional on A = a;B = b, the pair
X

a
;
b
; Y

a
;
b
has the joint distribution just stated; and X = X

A
;
B
, Y = Y

A
;
B
.
The probability space carrying all these random variables carries alongside the play-
ing cards A and B and the player's responses X and Y another eight random variables
describing what the players would have responded under each possible combination of
cards:
X

0
;
0
; Y

0
;
0
;
X

0
;
1
; Y

0
;
1
;
X

1
;
0
; Y

1
;
0
;
X

1
;
1
; Y

1
;
1
:
Since we have dened X = X

A
;
B
, Y = Y

A
;
B
, we need just ten of these twelve 0   1-
valued variables, so we could work with an abstract sample space 
 containing 2
10
= 1024
points, conceptual outcomes, !. We only observe four of the variables, namely A;B;X; Y
so we can reduce the sample space to just 2
4
= 16 distinguishable outcomes. Their
probabilities have been specied and will violate Bell's inequality. The point to be made is
that: a classical sample space suces perfectly to describe the experiment which is actually
carried out; Bell's inequality is not true; the probabilities which we assign to points of the
sample space were derived from quantum physics. The larger sample space with 1024
outcomes includes a modelling of `what would have happened if : : : ' as well as modelling
what actually did happen. It is not forbidden in probability theory to work with a larger
sample space than strictly speaking necessary.
Now as we saw before Bell's inequality followed in classical probability not just from
the mere existence of the four random variables A;B;X; Y but from a further assumption,
which had nothing to do with the requirements of classical probability, but from physical
modelling: namely that X = g(A;Z); Y = h(B;Z), where g and h are some functions
and Z a random element independent of A;B. The fact that Bell's inequality is violated
implies not that Kolmogorov's axioms of probability fail, but that the physical modelling
assumption is untenable. To investigate the place of such an assumption in our quan-
tum experiment we must think more deeply about where the randomness of the photons'
behaviour at the two lters comes from.
Let us look back at our classical model for the quantum experiment. Our mathemat-
ical model included random variables X

0
;
0
and X

0
;
1
, each describing the (potential)
behaviour of one of the two photons at a lter set at the orientation 
0
, while the other
photon, somewhere far away, is encountering a lter in the orientation 
0
or 
1
. One could
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argue on physical grounds (note: not mathematical grounds!) that the behaviour of the rst
photon should not depend on the setting of the second lter. In other words, the two ran-
dom variables X

0
;
0
and X

0
;
1
are identical. The same argument applied to three other
pairs of our eight `hidden variables' reduces the eight to four, say X

0
= X

0
;
0
= X

0
;
1
;
etc. Now we have Bell's inequality for the four random variables X

a
, Y

b
, a; b = 0; 1. But
Bell's inequality is violated. Conclusion: in any model which includes random variables
describing each photon's behaviour under each pair of lter settings, it cannot be true that
X

0
;
0
= X

0
;
1
.
Let us give another analysis of the Bell spel, more closely tied to our model of the
classical experiment. It is clear that the outcomes of the lter experiments at the two
locations are dependent of one another. But the two measurements are made on two
photons which were created in a single atomic event, so it could be that the dependence
which we see is caused by the fact that the two photons share some property Z

which may
vary in repetitions of the experiment. In other words, if we were able to restrict attention
to a subsequence of outcomes in which Z

continually took the same value, the behaviour
of the two photons at the two lters would become independent. We allow the two photons
still to exhibit random behaviour at the two lters. After all, the lter is also built of a
large number of particles which also exhibit quantum behaviour if looked at separately.
Let us suppose therefore that conditional on Z

= z

, and conditional on the lter settings
A = a and B = b, the two photons pass the two lters independently of one another with
probabilities which depend only on Z

and the setting of the relevant lter a or b. Note
that this assumption is a physical assumption; it is not dictated by mathematical demands
on the model coming from our choice to work within the usual framework of probability
theory. Translated into mathematics, the assumption becomes
P(X = x; Y = y j Z

= z

; A = a;B = b) = p(x j a; z

)q(y j b; z

)
where p(x j a; z

) = P(X = x j A = a;Z

= z

), etc. Now given A and B and Z

, let
U and V be independent uniform[0; 1] random variables. Using the notation 1f: : :g to
denote an indicator random variable, an elementary calculation shows that the quintuple
(A;B;Z

; 1fU  p(1 j A;Z

)g; 1fV  q(1 j B;Z

)g) has the same joint distribution
as (A;B;Z

;X; Y ). This follows since given A = a, B = b, Z

= z

, the two indicator
variables 1fU  p(1 j A;Z

)g, 1fV  q(1 j B;Z

)g are independent each with probabilities
p(1 j a; z

) and q(1 j b; z

) to take the value 1, just like X and Y .
Now write Z = (Z

; U; V ). We have shown that (in distribution) X and Y are
functions g(A;Z), h(B;Z), where Z is independent of A and B; specically,
g(a; z) = g(a; (z

; u; v)) = 1fu  p(1 j a; z

)g;
and similarly for h(b; z). Thus our physical modelling of the two-photon system has led to
it satisfying the same model as a classical randomization device, leading to Bell's inequality
again. The correct conclusion is that our physical assumptions must be false (not the rules
of probability theory).
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Discussion
We have shown that the Aspect experiment can be perfectly well modelled using classical
probabililty theory. In fact, the way we have done this could be followed in any quantum
probability model: use quantum mechanics to derive the joint probability distribution of
measurements of any set of compatible observables; now form the product space containing
as independent components all the possible sets of measurements which could have been
taken.
Admittedly this is a very clumsy construction. In fact it forms a pretty simplistic
but physically implausible hidden variables model: it describes in a deterministic way
what would have been the outcome of any particular set of measurements on the quantum
system. Consequently, as the violation of Bell's inequality shows, this hidden variables
model will violate physical (not mathematical) requirements of locality. But note: this
unfortunate state of aairs follows from the wish to incorporate deterministic physical
reasoning into the model, not from the demands of classical probability theory. If one
wishes to avoid hidden variables one simply reduces the sample space to contain just the
random variables which are actually measured. Now we have a minimal classical probability
model about which no complaints can be made.
Now I have not tried to hide the fact that we need quantum physics to write down the
probabilities which go into building our models. I could have used slightly dierent words
and said: not quantum physics, but quantum probability. In other words it remains true
that quantum probability as further developed in the later sections of KM is a beautiful
and useful mathematical model for quantum phenomena. In my opinion it does not replace
classical probability, but rather it coordinates the classical probability models which can
be written down for any particular set of measurements which one would care to make on a
quantum system. From the point of view of modern mathematical statistics, in which the
notion of `statistical experiment' is an established term for certain families of probability
spaces, one might better talk of `Quantum Experiments' than `Quantum Probability' (cf.
also design of experiments, convergence of experiments, : : : ).
Careful reading of KM shows where they fall into the trap: repeatedly they try to
identify ! with a particular physical object, e.g., a photon. In other words their nding
that classical probability is not adequate for quantum phenomena is really a nding that
classical deterministic thinking is inadequate: quantum phenomena are more truly random
than any other phenomena one can imagine. We all believe that the toss of a coin is ruled by
completely deterministic laws; however the passage of a photon through a polarization lter
is intrinsically truly random (unless one likes to adopt hidden variables models exhibiting
severely non-local behaviour). In other words again: God does not throw ordinary dice.
The fact remains that the players in the Bell spel can achieve results unachievable
with classical randomization devices. Does this mean that we do have here `action at a
distance'? Are they using the dependence of the behaviour of one photon on the setting
of a distant lter to communicate with one another faster than the speed of light? My
interpretation of the phenomenon is that the coupled state of the two photons has certainly
allowed the two players to coordinate their actions at a distance, in a way which they
could also have done if they had been able to exchange information faster than the speed
of light. Of course if they had been able to do the latter, they could have achieved even
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more spectacular results (like always saying the same answer). Coordination at a distance
is not the same as action at a distance. In the actual Aspect experiment lter settings were
used so that the predicted violation of Bell's inequality would be as extreme as it possibly
can be under standard quantum theory. If empirically an even more severe violation of
Bell's inequality had been observed, also standard quantum probability would have been
discredited.
From the point of view of the quantum system one could say that the two-photon
system reacts to probing at distant locations as a whole; its reaction to the dierent
measurements exhibits a dependence over great distances which cannot be explained in a
classical way.
From a pure mathematical point of view one may say that it is true that Quantum
Probability Theory is a dierent kind of probability-theory to ordinary probability theory.
Mathematically it is a genuine extension. Drawing analogies between random variables
and observables, between probability measures and states, between events and Hilbert
subspaces, we see that the axioms of quantum probability are weaker than those of classical
probability. In a mathematical sense the one is an extension of the other. This analogy
may be useful in many ways, but it is also dangerous since it simply is not true that the
notion of an observable makes that of a random variable superuous: measurement of an
observable yields a random variable so we have to talk about both. Another danger is that
pure mathematical analogy may lead one to dene new quantum probability concepts by
mathematical analogy, without there being any physical raison d'etre for the new concepts;
e.g., dene quantum conditional expectation g(X) = E(Y j X) by minimizing E(Y  
g(X))
2
, when the dierence between two incompatible observables does not have any
physical interpretation at all.
An extreme example supposing to show that quantum probability is a dierent kind
of probability was oered recently in Malley and Hornstein (1993). The example has been
used in the literature for this purpose for a long time and it is amazing to me to still see it
being used, since the conict with standard stochastic modelling principles is so blatant.
The two-slit experiment as discussed by Feynman (1951) as well as in the Feynman lectures
(part III) is also the same example in dierent clothing. KM have dressed up the example
in more impressive clothing but really the example is the same.
Malley and Hornstein (1993) considered a photon passing through two polarization
lters aligned at right angles so that no photon passing the rst also passes the second.
Now insert a third lter at 45

between the other two and suddenly photons do pass all
three lters. Apparently this is an example of three events A, B, C (passage of the three
lters) such that P(A \B \C) > P(A \C); the latter probability being in fact zero. This
example strikingly illustrates the trap. We are talking about two dierent experiments, one
with two lters, one with three. The two experiments share two events `the photon passes
the rst lter' and `the photon passes the last lter'. Obviously these events have a lot in
common from a physical point of view. However a priori there is no reason to suppose that
they can be modelled by the same event in the same probability space. Further physical
assumptions are needed before we can identify P, 
, A, and C in the two experiments. If
we do that but must accept that P(A \B \C) > P(A \ C) we have not violated classical
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probability (1+1 = 2) but we have proved that the physical assumptions we made are not
all true.
I hope that this criticism will help newcomers to quantum probability to be able to
penetrate the smokescreen of mistaken interpretations and confused arguments in order to
appreciate what a beautiful source it is of fascinating (classical) stochastic models, and a
eld full of rewards for ordinary probabilists and statisticians looking for fresh challenges.
I hope it will also encourage researchers within the eld to be more critical of received
wisdom concerning the nature of quantum probability, and more careful to give consistent
and appealing physical interpretations to their mathematical models so as to aid rather
than abet newcomers attempting to appreciate their work.
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